Before the First Tool Turns
Before the First Tool Turns
""Prior Preparation and Planning Prevents Poor Performance."
Most people who have served in the military, emergency services or heavy industry have heard some version of the old "Five Ps". While the original saying has been repeated so often it risks becoming cliché, its underlying message remains remarkably relevant.
Performance rarely begins when work starts.
By the time someone picks up a tool, starts a vehicle, enters a confined space or begins a critical task, much of the outcome has already been influenced by decisions made hours, days or even weeks earlier.
The work scope has been defined.
Hazards have - or have not - been identified.
Risks have been assessed. Controls have been implemented and are being monitored.
People have been trained.
Equipment has been inspected.
Resources have been allocated.
Emergency arrangements have been considered.
What follows is often the visible consequence of everything that came before.
Throughout my career I've participated in investigations across military operations, policing, mining, heavy industry and local government. Although the circumstances have varied considerably, one observation has remained remarkably consistent.
The incident usually occurs during the task.
The conditions that allowed it to occur often existed long before the task began.
Sometimes the work scope was poorly defined. Sometimes assumptions went unchallenged. On other occasions, critical controls had been identified but never verified, contractors had not been adequately briefed, or changing site conditions had not been incorporated into the planning process. The task itself simply exposed weaknesses that already existed within the system.
This observation is well supported by both research and practice.
James Reason's work on organisational accidents distinguishes between active failures occurring at the operational level and latent conditions embedded within organisational systems. These latent conditions often originate during planning, design, supervision, resourcing and decision-making, remaining unnoticed until they combine with operational circumstances to produce an incident.
The same philosophy underpins ISO 31000, which emphasises that risk management should be integrated into organisational governance, planning, decision-making and day-to-day operations rather than applied as a separate activity once work is ready to commence. Risk management is most effective when it shapes decisions before exposure occurs, not afterwards.
The mining industry has reached similar conclusions.
The International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM) promotes Critical Control Management as a means of preventing material unwanted events through the identification, implementation and ongoing verification of controls that are essential to managing critical risks. Importantly, those controls are not developed at the workface. They are established through disciplined planning, engineering, operational design and organisational assurance long before work begins.
This distinction matters.
Many organisations devote considerable effort to the execution of work while treating planning as an administrative requirement. Job Safety and Environmental Analyses, Safe Work Method Statements, permits and pre-start meetings can become procedural milestones rather than opportunities to critically examine how the work will actually be performed.
When that happens, planning risks becoming documentation rather than decision-making.
High Reliability Organisations (HROs) approach the problem differently. Rather than assuming success because previous work has been completed safely, they remain preoccupied with failure, continually asking what has changed, what assumptions are being made and where existing controls may no longer be sufficient. That mindset encourages curiosity rather than compliance and recognises that changing conditions often demand changing controls.
Perhaps this explains why some organisations consistently deliver better operational outcomes than others.
It is rarely because they have better paperwork.
It might be because they create better conditions for people to succeed.
Clear work scopes.
Realistic risk assessments.
Verified critical controls.
Competent people.
Effective supervision.
Open communication.
Well-rehearsed emergency arrangements.
These are not administrative tasks completed before "the real work" begins.
They are the work.
As W. Edwards Deming famously observed, most problems arise from the system rather than the individual. While the exact proportion is often debated, the principle remains highly relevant. Organisations should be cautious about attributing poor performance solely to frontline workers when the conditions influencing that performance were established elsewhere.
Perhaps that is the enduring lesson behind the old military saying.
Prior preparation and planning do prevent poor performance.
Not because planning guarantees success, but because it provides the greatest opportunity to influence the conditions under which people will ultimately perform.
By the time the first tool turns, much of the outcome has already been decided.
References
Reason, J. (1997). Managing the Risks of Organisational Accidents.
ISO 31000:2018, Risk Management – Guidelines.
International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM). Critical Control Management Implementation Guide.
Weick, K. E., & Sutcliffe, K. M. (2015). Managing the Unexpected: Sustained Performance in a Complex World.
Deming, W. E. (1986). Out of the Crisis.
